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is separated into two levels of regulation. CARB regulates air pollution from cars, trucks, buses and other sources, often referred to as “mobile sources”. Local air districts regulate <br />businesses and industrial facilities. Local air districts are the bodies that regulate ozone, PM 2.5 and PM 10. Ground level ozone (ozone), more commonly referred to as smog, is a pollutant <br />that forms on hot summer days (not to be confused with the ozone that forms in the upper atmosphere or stratosphere). Ozone is not directly emitted by one source but comes from a combination <br />of volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxides. In the presence of sunlight, especially on hot summer days, this mixture forms ozone. Particulate Matter (PM) is made up of fine solid <br />or liquid such as dust, fly ash, soot, smoke, aerosols, fumes, mists, and condensing vapors. US EPA has set health based standards for particles smaller than 10 microns (PM 10) and particles <br />smaller than 2.5 microns (PM 2.5). When these particles become airborne, they can be suspended in the air for long periods of time. Both PM 10 and PM 2.5 have been determined to cause <br />serious adverse health effects. According to an April 2012 report by the California Air Pollution Control Officer’s Association “California’s Progress Toward Clean Air”: Despite significant <br />improvements, air quality remains a major source of public health concern in large metropolitan areas throughout California. The San Joaquin and South Coast Air Basin <br />12 continue to face significant challenges in meeting the federal health-based standards for ozone and fine particles, despite their regional and state-level controls on mobile and stationary <br />sources that are the most stringent in the nation. In 2007, both regions sought extension for meeting the 1997 8-hour federal ambient air quality standard for ozone. A comparable challenge <br />faces each region with respect to attainment of the 1997 PM2.5 standard. Due to continued progress in health research, the federal EPA lowered the ambient concentration for the 8-hour <br />ozone and 24-hour PM 2.5 standards in 2008 and 2006, respectively. The net effect of these stricter standards is to raise the performance bar for California air basins. This will extend <br />the timeframe for attainment in highly polluted regions as well as increase the number of basins with non-attainment status. Challenges also exist for air districts across California <br />who are in attainment with the federal standards, as they continue to strive for attainment of the State’s health-based ozone and PM standards, which are more stringent than the standards <br />adopted by the US EPA. According to the Sponsor, areas designated nonattainment are mandated under the provision of the federal Clean Air Act to require (pursuant to New Source Review <br />Rules) Best Available Control Technology (BACT) and offsetting emissions reduction on major new or modified stationary sources of those nonattainment air pollutants and their precursors <br />regardless of whether or not the area so designated has any control and not over the pollution causing the nonattainment finding. The Sponsor also notes that there are a variety of other <br />mandates and regulations at the state level that have the potential to conflict both directly and indirectly with the implementation of AB 32 measures being proposed and implemented <br />by CARB. Two measures pointed out by the Sponsor are the existing mandate for local jurisdictions to divert 50% of solid waste from landfills (Public Resources Code 41780) and the state <br />Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) that requires all retail sellers (Investor Owned Utilities, electric service providers, and community choice aggregators) and all publicly owned utilities <br />to procure at least 33% of electricity delivered to their retail customers from renewable resources by 2020. Fiscal Impact: Unknown. No direct fiscal impact to city general funds. Existing <br />League Policy: Specific to this Resolution, existing policy states: Air Quality 􀁸 The League believes cities should have the authority to establish local air quality standards and programs <br />that are stricter than state and federal standards. The League opposes efforts to restrict such authority. 􀁸 The League opposes legislation redirecting the funds authorized by Health <br />and Safety Code Section 44223, which are currently used by local governments for locally based air quality programs. 􀁸 The League opposes air quality legislation that restricts the <br />land use authority of cities. Climate Change 􀁸 The League recognizes that climate change is both immediate and long term, with the potential for profound environmental, social and economic <br />impacts to the planet and to California. 􀁸 Through the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32 (Nuñez) Chapter 488, Statutes of 2006) California has embarked on a plan that requires <br />the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. Although uncertainty remains about the pace, distribution and magnitude of the effects of climate change, the League <br />recognizes the need for immediate actions to mitigate the sources of greenhouse gas emissions and has adopted the following principles: 1. Action Plans for Mitigating Greenhouse Gas <br />Emissions. Encourage local governments to complete <br />13 an inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, set appropriate reduction targets, and create greenhouse gas emission reduction action plans. 2. Smart Growth. Consistent with the League’s <br />Smart Growth policies, encourage the adoption of land use policies designed to reduce sprawl, preserve open space, and create healthy, vibrant, and sustainable communities. 3. Green <br />Technology Investment Assistance. Support tax credits, grants, loans and other incentives to assist the public, businesses, and local agencies that invest in energy efficient equipment <br />and technology, and fuel efficient, low emission vehicles. 4. Energy and Water Conservation and Efficiency. Encourage energy efficiency, water efficiency, and sustainable building practices <br />in new and existing public, residential and commercial buildings and facilities. This may include using the U.S. Green Building Council’s LEED program or similar systems. 5. Increase <br />the Use of Clean Alternative Energy. Promote the use and purchase of clean alternative energy through the development of renewable energy resources, recovery of landfill methane for <br />energy production and waste-to-energy technologies. 6. Reduction of Vehicle Emissions in Public Agency Fleets. Support the reduction of vehicle emissions through increased fuel efficiency, <br />use of appropriate alternative fueled vehicles, and/or low emission vehicles in public agency fleets. Encourage the use of appropriate alternative fueled vehicles, and/or low emission <br />vehicles in private fleets. 7. Climate Change Impacts. Encourage all levels of government to share information to prepare for climate change impacts. 8. Coordinated Planning. State policy <br />should encourage and provide incentive for cities to coordinate and share planning information with neighboring cities, counties, and other governmental entities so that there are agreed <br />upon regional blueprints and strategies for dealing with greenhouse gas emissions. 9. Water Supply for New Development. Encourage exchange of water supply information between state and <br />local local agencies, including information on the impacts of climate change on state and local water supplies. 10. Recycles Content and Green Purchasing Policies. Encourage the adoption <br />and implementation of recycled content and green procurement policies, if fitness and quality are equal, including the adoption of an Environmental Management System and authorization <br />of local agencies to consider criteria other than only cost in awarding contracts for services. Additionally, the League’s Mission Statement is “to expand and protect local control for <br />cities through education and advocacy to enhance the quality of life for all Californians.” Finally, the League’s Strategic Priorities for 2012, as adopted by the League Board of Directors, <br />include: In addition, the Strategic Priorities for 2012, as adopted by the League Board of Directors, are to: 1) Support Sustainable and Secure Public Employee Pensions and Benefits: <br />Work in partnership with state leaders and other stakeholders to promote sustainable and secure public pensions and other post-employment benefits (OPEBs) to help ensure responsive and <br />affordable public services for the people of our state and cities. 2) Promote Local Control for Strong Cities: Support or oppose legislation and proposed constitutional amendments based <br />on whether they advance maximum local control by city governments over city revenues, <br />14 land use, redevelopment and other private activities to advance the public health, safety and welfare of city residents. 3) Build Strong Partnerships for a Stronger Golden State: <br />Collaborate with other public and private groups and leaders to reform the structure and governance, and promote transparency, fiscal integrity, and responsiveness of our state government <br />and intergovernmental system. RESOLUTIONS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SAFETY POLICY COMMITTEE 􀆇􀀔 A RESOLUTION CALLING UPON THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE TO ENACT LEGISLATION THAT WOULD CORRECT <br />INEFFICIENCIES IN THE AUDIT SYSTEM, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND INEQUITIES IN THE FORMULAS FOR DISTRIBUTING COURT ORDERED ARREST AND CITATION FINES, FEES AND ASSESSMENTS GENERATED BY LOCAL <br />GOVERNMENT. Source: City of Glendora Referred to: Public Safety and Revenue & Taxation Policy Committee Recommendation to General Resolutions Committee: WHEREAS, the primary purpose <br />of criminal and traffic laws is to improve safety for the public, where the cost involved to implement enforcement falls primarily upon local law enforcement agencies throughout the <br />State; and WHEREAS, if State laws are to be effectively enforced then local cities must have a fair revenue structure to pay the cost of making arrests and issuing citations for criminal <br />and traffic violators; and WHEREAS, the significant inequity in the amount cities receive in relation to the full cost of a citation and/or arrest results in an unfair distribution of <br />revenue to cities that are generated by court fines, fees, surcharges, penalties and assessments levied on offenders; and WHEREAS, the current inefficiencies in the system makes it practically <br />impossible for cities to insure transparency and effectively audit, administer and manage public funds that are generated by cities and distributed by the State and County; and WHEREAS, <br />to adequately protect and serve the public during this time of declining revenue and deteriorating services the inequities in the system needs to be changed; and WHEREAS, court-ordered <br />debt collection and revenue distribution is a complex system where there are few audits, if ever, done to determine if cities are receiving their fair share of disbursements; and WHEREAS, <br />once a debt has been collected, in whole or in part, distributing the money is not simple as there are over 150 ways collection entities are required to distribute revenue collected <br />from traffic and criminal court debts. Depending on the fine, fee, surcharge or penalty assessment imposed by the court has more than 3,100 separate court fines, fees, surcharges, penalties <br />and assessments levied on offenders that appear in statutes spanning 27 different state code sections; and WHEREAS, the current system makes it practically impossible for cities to effectively <br />administer and manage public funds that are generated by cities. Because of the complex system cities cannot determine if they are receiving their fair share of the fines collected; <br />and <br />15 WHEREAS, Counties and the State have statutory responsibility and power to conduct their audits, while cities do not currently have clear legal standing to demand access to court <br />records for purposes of conducting audits in a thorough and transparent manner which further shrouds the understanding of when and how revenue is distributed; and WHEREAS, in December <br />2011 at the request of the Glendora Police Department the Los Angeles Superior Court conducted a sample audit of 15 Glendora Police Department-issued citations from 2010. The results <br />of the sample audit revealed the City of Glendora received about 12% ($253) of the $2,063 in paid fines for the 12 of the 15 citations submitted. Three (3) of the citations in the audit <br />were sent to collection or warrants. Based on those results, the city received an average of $21, while the State and County received an average of $172 for each of the 12 citations. <br />The percentage breakdown for the city was 12.25% as compared to the State and County’s share of 86.75%; and WHEREAS, issuing a typical vehicle code violation citation can involve up <br />to an hour of the issuing officer’s time and the time of a records clerk tasked with entering citations into the database costing approximately $82 per hour. If the citation is challenged <br />the cost increases another $135 to cover the cost of court time and handling of the notices associated with such an appeal. Therefore, the cost incurred to issue a citation currently <br />is between $82 and $217, while the sample audit reveals the city is receiving about $21 in cost recovery; and WHEREAS, officials with Superior Court openly admit that similar results <br />would be expected for almost every jurisdiction in the State issuing citations due to the complexity and “Priority of Distribution” they must follow from the State of California. “Priority <br />Distribution” is triggered when a court reduces a fine for a citation. This process prohibits Judges from reducing penalty assessments and thus the only discretion Judges have in reducing <br />fines, fees and costs is to reduce the base fine, or city portion, of the total fine. This process has a significant impact on the amount of money cities issuing the citation will receive. <br />Rarely is the reduction in the fine taken from other stakeholders. Cities are one of the lowest priorities on the distribution list and often find themselves receiving significantly <br />less share-or no share after deducting State and County fees and surcharges; and now there let it be RESOLVED by the General Assembly of the League of California Cities, assembled in <br />San Diego on September 7, 2012, that the League of California Cities calls upon the State Legislature and Governor to: 1. Create an efficient system to provide cities with a clear authority <br />to audit the distribution of fines, fees, assessments and administrative costs for criminal and traffic violations; 2. Enact legislation that changes the “Priority Distribution” mandate <br />so cities receive the total cost of issuing, processing and testifying in court on criminal cases and traffic violations; and 3. That any reduction in fines, fees, assessments or costs <br />should be equally distributed from the total fine imposed, not just from the city base fine. //////////Background Information on Resolution No. 1 Source: City of Glendora <br />16 Background: Court-ordered debt collection and revenue distribution is a complex system where there are few audits, if ever, done to determine if cities are receiving their fair share <br />of disbursements. The current system makes it practically impossible for cities to effectively administer and manage public funds that are generated by cities. Because of the complex <br />system cities cannot determine if they are receiving their fair share of the fines collected. Once a debt has been collected, in whole or in part, distributing the money is not simple <br />as there are over 150 ways collection entities are required to distribute revenue collected from traffic and criminal court debts, depending on the fine, fee, surcharge or penalty assessment <br />imposed by the court and California has more than 3,100 separate court fines, fees, surcharges, penalties and assessments levied on offenders that appear in statutes spanning 27 different <br />government code. County and state have statutory responsibility and power to conduct their their audits, while cities do not currently have clear legal standing to demand access to court <br />records for purposes of conducting audits in a thorough and transparent manner which further shrouds the understanding of when and how revenue is distributed. At the request of the City <br />of Glendora, in December 2011, the Los Angeles Superior Court conducted a sample audit of 15 Glendora Police Department-issued citations from 2010. The results of the sample audit revealed <br />the Glendora received about 12% ($253) of the $2,063 in paid fines for the 12 of the 15 citations submitted. Three (3) of the citations in the audit had been sent to collection or warrants. <br />Based on those results, the city received an average of $21, while the state and county received an average of $172 for each of the 12 citations. The percentage breakdown for the city <br />was 12.25% as compared to the state and county’s share of 86.75.% Issuing a typical vehicle code violation citation can involve up to an hour of the issuing officer’s time and the records <br />clerk tasked with entering citations into the database costing approximately $82 per hour. If the citation is challenged the cost increases another $135 to cover the cost of court time <br />and handling of the notices associated with such an appeal. Therefore, the cost incurred to issue a citation that is currently between $82 about $217, while the sample audit reveals <br />the city is receiving about $21 in cost recovery. Officials with Superior Court openly admit that similar results would be expected for almost every jurisdiction in the state because <br />when a court reduces a fine it triggers a process called “Priority Distribution.” This process prohibits Judges from reducing penalty assessments imposed by the county and state and <br />thus the only discretion that Judges have in reducing fines is to reduce the Base Fine (City Portion) of the total fine. This mandate has a significant impact on the amount of money <br />cities issuing the citation receive. Rarely is the reduction in the fine taken from other stakeholders. Cities are one of the lowest priority on the distribution so often they find themselves <br />receiving significantly less share-or no share after deducting state and county fees and surcharges. The primary cost to implement enforcement falls upon local law enforcement agencies <br />throughout the state. This Resolution calls upon the State Legislature and Governor to create an efficient system to provide cities with a clear authority to audit the distribution of <br />fines, fees, assessments and administrative costs for criminal and traffic violations. In addition, legislation should be developed and passed that changes the “Priority Distribution” <br />mandate so the cities receive the total cost of issuing, processing and testifying in court on criminal cases and traffic violations and that any reduction in fines, fees, assessments <br />or costs should be equally distributed from the total fine imposed. ////////// <br />17 League of California Cities Staff Analysis on Resolution No. 1 Staff: Dorothy Holzem, Assoc. Legislative Representative, (916) 658-8214 Committee: Public Safety Policy Committee Staff: <br />Dan Carrigg, Legislative Representative, (916) 658-8222 Committee: Revenue and Taxation Policy Committee Summary: This Resolution urges the League of California Cities, through legislative <br />or administrative means, to clarify the authority for cities to audit the distribution of court imposed fines, fees, penalty assessments and administrative costs for criminal and traffic <br />violations. It also urges the League to seek legislative changes to the “Priority Distribution” statutory formula so that cities receive the total cost of issuing, processing and testifying <br />in court on criminal cases and traffic violations. The current statutory formula allows reductions to the base fine but maintains the same level of penalty assessments, based upon the <br />full penalty charge. Finally, any reductions that may occur in fines, fees, assessments or costs determinations should be equally distributed from the total fine imposed, not just from <br />the city base fine. This Resolution raises several policy questions: 1) Should cities have the authority to request audits and receive reports from a county or the state on the local <br />share of revenue resulting from criminal and traffic violation penalties? 2) Should cost-recovery be a driving factor in setting monetary penalties for criminal or traffic violations? <br />3) Should reductions (as ordered by a judge) to the fines owed by violators be taken just out of the base fine, or should the base fine and related penalty assessments be reduced proportionately? <br />Background: In California, criminal offenders may have additional penalty assessments made to their base fines. These penalty assessments are based on the concept of an “abusers fee,” <br />in which those who break certain laws will help finance programs related to decreasing those violations. For example, drug and alcohol offenses and domestic violence offenses are enhanced <br />by special assessments on fines that directly fund county programs designed to prevent the violations. All other criminal offenses and traffic violations are subject to penalty assessments <br />that are used to fund specific state programs. According to the Resolution sponsor, the City of Glendora, the court-ordered collection of penalty fines and additional assessments, as <br />well as the subsequent revenue distribution, is a complex system where few audits are conducted to determine if cities are receiving their share of collections. The current system makes <br />it practically impossible for cities to effectively administer and manage public funds that are generated by cities. The League recently held in-depth policy discussions related to audit <br />authority in light of the misconduct charges against the City of Bell in 2011. The League convened a technical working group to review audit legislation and administrative efforts by <br />the State Controller’s Office. Following the work of this group, the League Board adopted principles supporting transparent, accurate financial and performance information. (See “Existing <br />Policy” section below.) However, these principles did not address expanding cities’ audit authority over the state, counties, or other public agencies. <br />18 The sponsors state that there are over 150 ways collection entities are required to distribute revenue collected from traffic and criminal court debts. Depending on the fine, fee, <br />surcharge or penalty assessment imposed, there are more than 3,100 separate court fines, fees, surcharges, penalties and assessments levied on offenders that appear in statutes spanning <br />27 different state code sections. Generally, the base fines for criminal and traffic citations are significantly lower than the additional penalty assessments levied by the state and <br />counties. In some instances, the penalty assessment for state and local programs can be three or four times the amount collected by the city or county agency that issued the citation <br />through their local enforcement authority. The amount each program account receives is based on a statutory formula. For example, if a driving under the influence (DUI) fine is $1000, <br />specific dollar amounts proportionate to the base fine are added under six different code sections for a total price tag of $3,320 for the offense. Some examples of program accounts <br />receiving penalty assessment revenues include Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST), victim witness protection and services, court security, court construction, forensic laboratories <br />for DNA identification, and automated fingerprint identification. The impact of programs largely funded, if not solely funded, by penalty assessment revenue casts a wide net of stakeholders <br />including counties, sheriffs, district attorneys, public defenders, fish and game wardens, victim advocates, and access to the judicial system advocates. Cities are also partial benefactors <br />of penalty assessment funded programs related to law enforcement. For the last three decades, this policy area has been under great scrutiny and study but with little reform taking place. <br />The recommendations from past studies and reports to consolidate penalty assessment accounts or their collections efforts, which would require legislative action, have likely not gained <br />traction because of the inevitable loss of revenue for the specific programs and the affected interest groups. In 1986, the Legislature enacted Senate Concurrent Resolution 53, requiring <br />the Legislative Analyst Office (LAO) to study the statutory penalty assessments that are levied by the courts on offenders and the state programs that the funds support. The completed <br />1988 study found a complicated system of collection and distribution of penalty funds. The LAO was unable to fully identify the source offenses that generated penalty revenues because <br />of limitations in most county collection systems. In 2005, the California Research Bureau issued a report for the Assembly Public Safety Committee on county penalty assessments that <br />drew similar conclusions. They stated the complexity of the system means poor revenue collection, disproportionate justice for debtors, and undermines the usefulness of fines as a punishment <br />or deterrent. They recommended efforts to streamline and consolidate collections, funding, and appropriations. After some delay, the state created the Administrative Office of the Court’s <br />Court-Ordered Debt Task Force, which is charged with evaluating and exploring means to streamline the existing structure for imposing and distributing criminal and traffic fines and <br />fees. This Task Force has been asked to present preliminary recommendations to the Legislature regarding the priority in which court-ordered debt should be satisfied and the use of comprehensive <br />collection programs. Currently, the League of California Cities has two appointments to the Task Force. However, the Task Force has been put on hiatus and has not met for approximately <br />12 months due to significant state cuts to the court budget in recent years. Currently, legislation was introduced this year to address the issue of cities not recouping the costs of <br />issuing citations. The response has been to increase the base fine and not change penalty assessments. Assembly Bill 2366 (Eng) would increase the base fine of “fix-it” tickets from <br />$10 to $25 dollars. This has largely been successful in the legislative fiscal committees because with every increase to the base fine for the issuing agency, so increases the state <br />and county share of penalty assessments proportionately. <br />19 Lastly, in most instances when the legislature takes into consideration a fine increase, be it for manufacturer product responsibility or criminal acts, the legislature focuses on <br />how the increased fine will alter behavior, not on recovering the costs of enforcing that violation. Fiscal Impact: Unknown. Potential additional revenue received by cities, if any, <br />would vary based on total citations issued and collected. Existing League Policy: Related to this Resolution, existing policy offers: 􀁸 Cities and the League should continue to emphasize <br />efficiency and effectiveness, encouraging and assisting cities to achieve the best possible use of city resources. 􀁸 The League supports efforts to preserve local authority and accountability <br />for cities, state policies must ensure the integrity of existing city revenue sources for all cities, including the city share and situs allocation, where applicable, of property tax, <br />sales tax, vehicle license fee, etc. Audit Principles Adopted by the League Board 􀁸 Given the State already has substantial authority to examine local government financial practices, <br />and recognizes the significant resources required by auditors and local governments to complete audits, additional authority should only be granted to a State agency when there are documented <br />insufficiencies in its existing authority. 􀁸 Governmental financial audits and performance audits ensure financial integrity and promote efficient, effective and accountable local government. <br />􀁸 Transparent, accurate financial and performance information is necessary for citizens to have confidence that their interests are being served, and for decision makers to be accountable <br />for ensuring that public funds are spent appropriately and effectively. 􀁸 Public trust is inspired when auditors perform their work with independence, objectivity and integrity, remaining <br />free from personal, external and organizational impairments to that independence, both in fact and in appearance. 􀁸 Public confidence in government is maintained and strengthened when <br />financial and performance information is collected, managed and reported