Vacations - Easements, Reserves, Streets, Walkways - 1979-1981 pt1

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• EAST BAY MUN. UTILITY DIST. V. 351 RICHMOND REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY 93 Cal.App.3d 346;—Cal.Rptr. — (3) While conceding that its right to the water utilities was but a statutory franchise or easement, EBMUD nevertheless maintains that the case at bench is not governed by the afore stated common law rule. -Its primary contention is that the relocation in dispute took place under the California Community Redevelopment Law (§§ 33390, 33391, , and 33395) and that this enactment constitutes specific legislation which carves out an exception to the common law implied obligation and renders the Agency liable for the relocation cost of water utilities (East Bav Muni. Utility Dist. v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 789 [124 Cal.Rptr. 606]; see also Vermont Gas Systems, Inc. v. Citv of•Burlington (1971) 130 Vt. 75 [286 A.2d 2751; City of Center Line v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. (1970) 26 Mich.App. 659 [182 N. W.2d 769] (affd. 387 Mich. 260 [196 N.W.2d 144]); City of Columbus v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co. (1972) 152 Ind.App. 22 .[281 N.E.2d 5101; Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. City of Little Rock (1974) 256 Ark. 112 [506 S.W.2d 555]). Respondent's position is not well taken. Although the Legislature may grant a utility the right to compensation for relocating its facilities to accommodate a proper governmental use of the street, such right will not be deemed to have been given unless the - Legislature specifically so provides (Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of L A., supra, 50 Cal.2d 713, 719; First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine Turnpike Auth. (1957) 153 Me. 131 [136 A.2d 699, .7.11]; Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Lindsay (1969) 24 N.Y.2d 309 [300 N.Y.S.2d 321, 327, 248 N.E.2d 150]). An analytical interpretation of sections 33390, 33391 and 33395 reveals that they, at best, set up a framework by which redevelopment agencies are authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain. At the same time, however, they fail to provide the requisite specific legislation with respect to the allocation of costs necessitated by the transfer of utility facilities from municipal streets. This interpretation is demonstrated first by the language of the statutory sections themselves. Section 33390 defines the term " `Real property' " as including "Every estate, 'interest, privilege, easement, franchise, and right in land ...' " (subd. (d)). Section 33391 empowers a redevelopment agency to "Acquire real property by eminent domain." (Subd. (b).) Lastly, section 33395 provides that "Property already devoted to a public use may be acquired by the agency through eminent domain...." A simple reading of these sections thus discloses that while the Legislature authorized the redevelopment agencies to acquire a variety of real property, including franchises, by eminent domain, the [May 19791