Vacations - Easements, Reserves, Streets, Walkways - 1979-1981 pt1

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352 EAST BAY MUN. UTILITY DIST. v.. RICHMOND REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY 93 Cal.App.3d 346; — Ca1.Rptr. — broad language of the cited sections was not intended to cover such specific matters as the allocation cost of displaced or transferred facilities. The interpretation given to the cited statutory provisions is further supported by case law. Thus, in Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v.-- Lindsay, supra, 300 N.Y.S.2d 321, a utility sought reimbursement for the cost of relocating its facilities from vacated streets in an urban renewal project area. Under the Administrative Code, owners of real property affected by the street closing were entitled to compensation. Consolidated Edison claimed that the definition of " `real property' " which included " `all surface and subsurface structures within closed streets and all easements and hereditaments, corporeal or incorporeal, and every estate, interest and right, legal and equitable, in lands, and every right, interest, .privilege, easement and franchise relating to the same' " (italics partially added) created an exception to the common law rule. The court rejected this argument, stating, "Contrary to Con Ed's contention, neither the' definition of `real property' ... nor anything else in title E of the Administrative Code abrogates the common-law rule. The burden and., expense traditionally imposed on the public utility to remove and relocate its property may not be transferred to the taxpayer absent `express direction of . the Legislature.' [Citation.] A broad definition of real property does not amount to such `express direction.' [Citation.] As a matter of fact, when the Legislature intends that the utility company be reimbursed for the relocation of its properties, it has done so in language which is clear and to the point." (P. 327; italics added.) The same type of statutory language was considered by the Supreme Court of Maine in First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine Turnpike Auth., supra, 136 A.2d 699. The statute authorized the turnpike authority to acquire by condemnation real property and interests in real property such as easements, franchises, etc. In holding that the broad language granting the turnpike authority the power to condemn did not show a clear . legislative intent that the authority was required to pay the cost of utility, relocation, the court underlined that "The enabling act does not in the very words state that the Authority may or must pay the relocation costs in dispute here. Nor does the act imply that those costs may or must be so paid. The description and enumeration of costs and properties fall short of containment of payments for expense arising from damages without the invasion of legal right. The rights of utilities to enjoy installations in. public streets or ways are positive and very respectable in the status of the law but they are subordinate to public travel and to the valid exercise of [May 19791